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Dispute Resolution in Europe: A Comparative Context for the
Resolution of Disputes Between Americans and Canadians
Hans Smit*
I. INTRODUCTION
Economic integration and its inevitable concomitant, political and legal
integration, are proceeding apace throughout the world. The Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) is moving full-stride towards its goal
of eliminating all obstacles to free intra-Community trade by January 1,
1993. Other European states, including recently liberalized Eastern Eu-
ropean states, are contemplating accession to the Community. The Can-
ada-United States Free Trade Agreement has provided the impetus for
the creation of a similar agreement between the United States and Mex-
ico. These developments raise questions concerning the impact they may
have on the resolution of disputes involving persons from different mem-
ber states.
Thus far, only the European Economic Community has addressed a
few of these questions by legislation. The European Convention on Juris-
diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters of 1968 contains elaborate rules on the jurisdiction of, and the
recognition of judgments rendered by, courts of member states regarding
persons within and without the Community.1 However, no attempt has
been made to harmonize the procedural rules in member state courts.
The motivation to create harmonized rules may be lacking since Euro-
pean procedural rules are to a great extent similar.
For the purpose of this comparative review, reference will be made
to prototypical European rules of procedure. As will be seen, European
approaches to problems of dispute resolution, as well as those developed
in recent years by international arbitration tribunals, provide examples
that merit serious consideration by those intent upon improving proce-
dures for the resolution of disputes, especially disputes with international
aspects.
* Stanley H. Fuld Professor of Law and Director of the Parker School of Foreign and Compar-
ative Law, Columbia University.
I Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Mat-
ters, Sept. 27, 1968, consolidated text in O.J. 1990 C. 1989/2, Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 03 [here-
inafter Judgments Convention].
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II. RULES OF ADJUDICATORY AuTHORITY
European rules of in personam adjudicatory authority2 differ from
American rules in a number of respects. They are not supplemented by
in rem or quasi in rem rules. Additionally, although they do provide for
the same types of adjudicatory bases as American long-arm statutes, they
also provide bases that are entirely lacking in, and indeed would be un-
constitutional under, American law and are therefore often called ex-
traordinary, or even exorbitant, by American scholars.
Just as European scholars regard as inappropriate the traditional
American rule of in personam power based on presence, which was re-
cently upheld by the United States Supreme Court, over constitutional
objections,3 Americans likewise regard as improper European rules that
provide for in personam power over defendants who have no, or no sig-
nificant, relationship to the forum. These European rules include: the
nationality of the plaintiff in French law; the domicile or residence of the
plaintiff in Dutch law; and the presence of property within the forum by
a non-resident in German law.4 These in personam bases of competence
may strike Americans as being unreasonable, but it should be stressed
that in the absence of in rem or quasi in rem bases, they serve to create a
forum for the plaintiff near his home. Moreover, the effects of these rules
are limited, since foreign courts, including European courts, normally
refuse to recognize a foreign judgment rendered on such a basis. As a
result, these rules create a basis for a judgment that can be enforced only
against property the defendant has within the forum. In their practical
effect, these rules come close to creating a form of in rem competence.
5
As might have been expected, the European Judgments Convention
eliminates the application of exorbitant bases of competence to residents
of member states. Significantly, it eliminates the traditional common law
basis of service on a person present within the forum.6
2 This is the term used to designate all forms of judicial authority. The term "jurisdiction" is
used to designate constitutional power or judicial power under conflict of law rules; "competence" to
designate all forms of judicial power, "International competence" is often used to designate judicial
power under conflict of law rules. See generally Hans Smit, The Terms Jurisdiction and Competence
in Comparative Law, 10 AM. J. COMP. L. 164 (1961).
3 Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 2105 (1990). It should be
noted, however, that, although Justice Scalia's opinion is cast in broad terms, the case adjudicated
was not one of transient presence.
4 Note that the presence of any such property is sufficient to create in personam competence.
There need not be a relation between the property and the claim presented, and the value of the
property may be minimal as compared with the amount of the claim presented. The so-called Aus-
laenderforum rule is sometimes called the "umbrella" rule so as to indicate the absence of a relation-
ship between the value of the property and the recovery sought.
5 These rules differ from American rules in that enforcement may also be had against property
subsequently brought into the forum.
6 Judgments Convention, supra note 1, art. 3. The Convention thus eliminates this basis in
regard to residents of other member states, although the English and American courts have thus far
refused to outlaw this basis generally.
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The Convention also contains other provisions that Americans may,
with justification, regard as most unfair. These provisions not only per-
mit recourse to exorbitant bases of competence in regard to non-residents
of member states, but, also, require the recognition of judgments based
on such bases in all member states.7 Thus, the Convention substantially
broadens the impact of judgments premised on such bases, so that they
are no longer effective only in the forum state. It is commonly known
that the inclusion of these provisions was inspired by a desire to compel
the United States to enter into treaties with member states regulating the
recognition of foreign judgments. However, there is no justifiable reason
for wanting to force the United States into entering such treaties, since,
under generally prevailing laws, the United States already grants at least
as broad a recognition to foreign judgments as would be required by the
type of convention contemplated.
While the European Judgments Convention, insofar as it permits
exorbitant bases and requires recognition of judgments rendered on such
bases, is definitely not worthy of emulation in the Canada-United States
context, it does deserve serious consideration insofar as it outlaws compe-
tence based on presence. Mere presence, without more, is no longer an
acceptable basis of competence and should be prohibited at least in
United States-Canada relations. In view of the recent Supreme Court
ruling in the Burnham case,8 this may require action by statute or treaty.
In the meantime, if mere presence is the only available basis of compe-
tence, American and Canadian courts should readily dismiss such cases
on forum non conveniens grounds.
III. SERVICE OF JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS
Service of judicial documents abroad was greatly facilitated by the
adoption in 1963 of Rule 4(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.9
The hallmark of Rule 4(i) is its flexibility. It permits service to be made,
at the option of the party seeking to have the service made, in a number
of ways, including personal delivery by a non-party over eighteen years
of age, service pursuant to foreign law, service by registered mail (return
receipt requested), service pursuant to court order, and service pursuant
to letters rogatory. The overriding goal of the drafters of Rule 4(i) was to
permit the party seeking the service to effectuate it in the simplest and
least cumbersome way possible. An additional objective was to avoid
involvement of, and possible objection by, foreign authorities. 10
The improvements introduced by Rule 4(i) appeared so attractive
7 Id. art. 3, in conjunction with art. 28, para. 3.
8 See Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. -, 110 S.Ct 2105 (1990).
9 On the amendments introducing Rule 4(i), see Hans Smit, International Aspects of Federal
Civil Procedure, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1031 (1963). Rule 4(i) was developed by the Columbia Project
in International Procedure, of which the author was the Director and principal draftsman.
10 See Snilt, supra note 9, at 1041-43.
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and worked so well that the United States took the initiative of making
them universally available through the international convention of the
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra-Judicial
Documents of 1965.11 Unfortunately, the Convention does not provide
for the simplest and most efficacious ways of making service permitted by
Rule 4(i). Specifically, service by a non-party over eighteen years of age
and service by registered mail are not included. This is of no great mo-
ment to litigants in American courts if they can simply forego recourse to
the Convention and, instead, proceed pursuant to Rule 4(i).
However, the Supreme Court, relying on Convention language that
does not compel the interpretation given it, and disregarding the ultimate
purpose of the Convention to simplify methods of service, has held that
the rules of Convention are exclusive when the service is to be made in a
Convention State.2 This ruling significantly limits the freedom that
would otherwise have been available under Rule 4(i). For instance, it
precludes service abroad by a non-party over eighteen years of age (one
of the easiest and simplest means of making service) and service pursuant
to court order. In addition, it precludes service by registered mail, ser-
vice by diplomatic or consular agents of the state of origin on non-nation-
als of that state, and service by officials of the state of destination,
whenever the state of destination objects.13
Fortunately, Canada has not objected to any of the methods of ser-
vice to which, pursuant to the Convention, it could object.' 4 Nonethe-
less, as long as the Convention is deemed exclusive, service by a non-
party over eighteen years of age or pursuant to court order will not be
available.
This problem can be overcome in a number of ways. The United
State and Canada could terminate their adhesion to the Convention un-
less it is made non-exclusive. Another solution would be for the United
States and Canada to enter into a bilateral agreement permitting service
to be made pursuant to existing domestic law. It could be argued that
such an agreement would run afoul of Canada's and the United States'
obligations under the Convention. Article 11 of the Convention permits
bilateral agreements relating to service, but only, it would appear from its
text, in order to permit channels of transmission other than those pro-
vided for in the Convention.15 States that are members of the Conven-
1 For the text of this Convention, see MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGEST, CANADIAN &
INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST, IC 1 (1991).
12 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988). Article I of the Con-
vention provides that it "shall apply in all cases, in civil or commercial matters, where there 
is
occasion to transmit a judicial or extrajudicial element for service abroad." This language by no
means requires the conclusion that the Convention shall apply exclusively in the cases specified.
13 Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, arts. 8 and 10, 20 U.S.T. 361; T.I.A.S. No. 6638 [hereinafter Service Convention].
14 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGEST, supra note 11, IC-4.
15 Service Convention, art. 11, reads: "The present Convention shall not prevent two or more
contracting States from agreeing to permit, for the purpose of service ofjudicial documents, channels
Vol. 17:281 1991
4
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 17 [1991], Iss. 2, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol17/iss2/10
Smit-DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EUROPE
tion could invoke the alleged breach as a ground for not applying the
Convention to the breaching states. This result is not particularly likely,
but even if this were to happen, it would not be a matter of significant
concern. The United States may be better off if it were not a member of
the Convention, and the same is likely to be true for Canada.
There is still another way of overcoming this problem, and it is by
far the simplest and most efficacious way of all. The United States and
Canada could adopt a rule that is firmly established in such European
countries as Germany and Austria.16 This rule holds that, as long as the
defendant has actually received the service, it does not matter that it was
not made in accordance with the applicable legal provisions. This rule is
based on the common-sensical notion that the ultimate purpose of service
rules is to ensure that the service actually reaches the addressee; once
that goal has been achieved, it does not make any difference if the proper
procedures were followed. Under this rule, regardless of whether service
is made abroad under Rule 4(i) or in compliance with the Convention, it
is valid and effective as long as it actually reached the addressee. In fact,
a motion by the addressee attacking the service would be the best proof
that the service reached the addressee. Indeed, this rule of validation of
an otherwise defective service is so appealing that the rulemakers should
consider adopting it for all forms of service, foreign as well as domestic.
The rulemakers are presently considering a proposal that would re-
quire a proposed addressee to waive service; if the waiver is improperly
refused, it would result in saddling the addressee with the cost of making
the service.17 This proposal is likely to add to the problems of making
service, for it creates another opportunity for ad hoc litigation on an issue
not related to the merits. One would think that the experience with Rule
11 would have encouraged the rulemakers to avoid collateral disputes
that only add to the litigation and cause additional expense and delay.
IV. OBTAINING PROOF IN ANOTHER COUNTRY
A. General Observations
In the early 1960s, American rules relating to obtaining proof in
foreign countries were re-evaluated. As a result, significant reforms came
about. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to taking deposi-
tions and obtaining documents and other tangible evidence abroad were
revised,"8 a new rule on proving foreign official documents was
of transmission other than those provided for in the preceding articles and, in particular, direct
communication between their respective authorities."
16 See HANs SMrr, INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN LmGATION: EUROPE (1965).
17 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, H.R. Doc. No. 102-77,
102d Cong., 1st Session (1991), revised Rule 4(d). The costs include, according to proposed Rule
4(d)(5), a reasonable attorney's fee for collecting the cost of service.
18 See Smit, supra note 9, at 1053-59.
5
Smit: Dispute Resolution in Europe: A Comparative Context for the Resol
Published by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1991
CANADA-UNITED STATES LAW JOURNAL
adopted,19 and proof of foreign law was greatly facilitated. 20 These revi-
sions were also presented to The Hague Conference and were embodied
in the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters21 and the Convention Abolishing the Requirement of
Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents.22 Canada has not ratified
either of these Conventions. However, since the Public Documents Con-
vention significantly facilitates proof of foreign official documents, Can-
ada should ratify it.
23
The same is not true of the Evidence Convention. This Convention
provides procedures for obtaining proof abroad that are significantly less
flexible than those available under American law. Not only does it not
provide for the easiest and simplest ways of obtaining such evidence, L e.,
the taking of a deposition before a person authorized to administer an
oath under American or foreign law or designated by stipulation, and the
service of a notice to produce,24 this Convention also enables states to
object to other methods of obtaining evidence that are quite common
under American practice.25
Fortunately, the United States Supreme Court has ruled this Con-
vention non-exclusive; 26 but, unfortunately, it has encouraged American
courts to give serious consideration to proceeding pursuant to the Con-
vention before taking recourse to domestic law procedures. 27 This may
well lead American courts to unduly favor Convention methods. Since
American law provides liberal assistance to Canadian courts and litigants
without any convention,28 Canada would be well advised not to ratify
this Convention.29
American procedures for determining foreign law are exceptionally
flexible. An American court may look at any source it deems useful,
without observing any rules of evidence.3" To the extent Canada does
not have similarly flexible rules, it should adopt them.
19 Id. at 1059-1071.
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
21 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIGEST, supra note 11, IC-14 (March 1970).
22 Id. at 1C-24 (Oct. 1961).
23 The Convention substitutes a uniform certificate for the sometimes quite complex authenti-
cation requirements imposed by domestic law.
24 The Convention probably fails to provide for these methods, because they do not exist in
civil law countries.
25 Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Oct. 7,
1972, arts. 15, 16, 17, & 23, 23 U.S.T. 2555; T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
26 Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court of S. Dist. Iowa, 482
U.S. 522, 107 (1987).
27 Id.
28 See Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
1015, 1019-1022 (1965).
29 Of course, I do not here consider whether it would be advantageous for Canada to have the
benefit of recourse to this Convention in its relations with countries other than the United States.
30 FED. R. Civ. P. 44(10).
Vol. 17:281 1991
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B. Blocking Statutes
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the enact-
ment of blocking statutes in Europe.3 These statutes, prohibiting the
solicitation and provision of evidence for use in foreign proceedings, find
their origin in a distaste for what are regarded abroad as unusually prob-
ing evidence gathering techniques, such as pre-trial depositions and doc-
ument discovery. One of the earliest examples originated in Canada in
response to American efforts to procure in Canada evidence of American
antitrust law violations.32
The United States does not have blocking statutes. On the contrary,
federal law broadly proclaims that anyone may seek evidence in the
United States for use in foreign proceedings.3 3 State law is generally in
accord.34
Canada would do well to repeal its blocking statutes. First, these
statutes lead to unseemly conflicts between judicial authorities. Second,
they generally do not work. If the person from whom the evidence is
sought is a party to the action or is otherwise subject to the American
court's jurisdiction, the court can order the party to produce the evi-
dence, either abroad or in the United States, regardless of the foreign
prohibition. After all, an American court can hardly be expected to de-
fer to foreign laws that are designed to frustrate its procedures.35 If the
person from whom the evidence is sought is not subject to the American
court's jurisdiction, the blocking statute is still unnecessary because that
person can refuse to provide the evidence if he is so disposed.
There is no place in today's world for blocking statutes of the kind
now prevalent. States should accord each other all possible cooperation
in procuring evidence for use in their courts. Such cooperation should be
refused only when the purpose for which the evidence is sought violates
basic values endorsed by the state in which it is sought. For example, if
the evidence is to be used in secret political trials or in a prosecution of a
person for his belief, religion, or race, cooperation should be denied. But
the mere circumstance that pre-trial depositions or document discovery
is unknown in domestic law is no reason for denying its benefits to a
31 See, eg., Law No. 68-578 of July 26, 1968, as amended by Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980
(France); Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, cl. 11 (U.K. (1980)). See generally Westbrook,
Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidence for Use in Litigation in the U.S., 13 INT'L LAW. 5 (1979).
32 Business Records Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 54, § 57 (1970). See also Business
Concerns Record Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. 278 (1964); Can. Stat. O.&R. 644 (Sept. 21, 1976, as
amended, Can. Cons. Reg. c 366).
33 28 U.S.C.A. § 1782 (1966).
34 Uniform Interstate and International Procedure Act § 2.04, 3.02, 13 U.L.A. 357, 386, 391-
92 (1962).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d 1384 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
103 S.Ct. 3086 (1982); In re Anschuetz & Co. G.m.b.H., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. granted
and remanded, 474 U.S. 812 (1987).
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litigant or court to whom it is an essential ingredient of the adjudicatory
process.
V. THE ADJUDICATORY PROCESS
A. European Systems
In civil law countries, pre-trial discovery, as known in common law
countries, does not exist.36 This may surprise common law lawyers, for
whom pre-trial discovery is the heart of the civil litigation process. They
may find it difficult to comprehend how civil law systems can achieve just
adjudication without permitting discovery of all information relevant to
the dispute.
The answer is simple. Civil law systems also seek to enable litigants
to discover the information needed to adjudicate the dispute. However,
they use different methods to achieve this goal. Since these methods are
largely effective, they deserve serious consideration by those intent upon
improving the U.S. system of civil adjudication. A particular advantage
of civil law methods is that they avoid the ad hoc adjudications that typi-
cally fragment an American lawsuit and result in the delays and exces-
sive expense that characterize contemporary discovery practice. The
principal means of gathering information needed to adjudicate a civil
case include: detailed pleadings, the requirement of a reasoned denial,
and, especially in French practice, the expertise.
(1) Elaborate Pleadings
In European countries, pleadings are not used solely to draw the
boundaries of the dispute and to define the issues to be resolved, but are
also the principal means for putting the whole dispute before the court.
As a consequence, they contain not only allegations of fact, but also legal
theories, and evidence. It is not unusual for the law to require that the
pleader not only state his claim for relief, but also identify and describe,
and if possible submit with his pleading, all pertinent evidence, and state
the legal basis for his claim or defense with reference to proper statutory
and other authoritative sources. In a real sense, the pleader is expected
to fully inform the court and his opponent of all relevant information.
(2) The Reasoned Denial
Another effective means of compelling a litigant to disclose relevant
information is the requirement that denials be reasoned. A simple denial
is insufficient to create an issue: the pleader must state the reasons for his
denial. If he fails to do so, the allegation is admitted. The reasoned de-
36 See generally HEROG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 7.22-7.57 (Smit ed. 1967); CAPPEL-
LET I & PERILLO, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY 8.01-8.50 (Smit ed. 1965). In exceptional circum-
stances, when a prospective witness is likely to depart, die, or otherwise be unavailable at an oral
hearing, the court may order his testimony to be taken earlier.
Vol. 17:281 1991
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nial is a most potent incentive to make full disclosure. Since the pleader
cannot risk that the court will find the denial insufficiently reasoned, he is
likely to provide more reasoning than necessary.
Of course, a litigant is not likely to disclose in his pleadings informa-
tion that does not serve his cause. However, his opponent is likely to do
so. A problem arises if the opponent does not have information that only
the adverse party possesses. The usual practice is to challenge the party
that has the information to produce it. If the court is persuaded that the
party has the information, it can draw an adverse inference from the
party's failure to produce it. But there generally is no other way to com-
pel its production. To that extent, European rules may fall short of
American-style discovery.
(3) Expertise
The French courts have developed an additional method for ob-
taining discovery. They routinely order an expertise, a report by experts,
when facts are to be ascertained. Originally intended as a method for
obtaining information on matters on which special expertise is required,
the French courts have used it as a device for gathering factual informa-
tion for which no special expertise is necessary. 37 The expert simply
gathers the information from all likely sources and renders his report to
the court. The parties are then afforded an opportunity to comment on
the report, and the court renders its decision.
The advantages of these methods are significant. They are self-im-
plementing and need no judicial supervision. They do not require ad hoc
adjudications, do not add significant additional expense, and cause no
undue delay. However, they fall short of compelling discovery in all situ-
ations in which it can be obtained under American practice.
B. The American System
While the American system of pre-trial discovery is likely to pro-
duce all relevant information that can properly be discovered, it has sig-
nificant drawbacks. It is in large measure conducted by the parties,
requiring ad hoc adjudication whenever the parties cannot agree on the
propriety of a particular step in the process. It is expensive and time-
consuming, and is in many instances duplicative. Moreover, when the
case goes to trial, the trial itself is in large measure a replay of the discov-
ery stage. At the heart of these problems is that discovery is conducted
by the parties, rather than by the court, and the parties or their lawyers
are not necessarily intent upon achieving just, inexpensive, and efficient
adjudication.38
Recently proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
37 On the Expertise, see Herzog, supra note 36, 7.54, at 349.
38 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the rules shall be construed to
secure the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determination of every action." FED R. Civ. P. 1.
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dure seek to import a greater measure of automatism into the process.
Under these amendments, each party must, of its own accord, disclose
documents and certain other information without being asked to do so by
the other party. Failure to comply results in the party being precluded
from presenting the evidence at the trial and the party may be subject to
other sanctions.39 The proposed amendments do not go as far as the
European rules, under which a party who fails to disclose information
which would make his pleading reasoned, may find that the court rules
against him on the merits.
C. International Arbitration
It is in international arbitration that the two systems of civil and
common law have met and produced an amalgam that appears worthy of
emulation. Increasingly, in international arbitration, especially when the
arbitration tribunal is composed of civil and common law lawyers, a pro-
cedure is adopted that combines elements of both civil law and common
law. The parties are instructed to submit elaborate pleadings alleging not
only ultimate facts, but also identifying and describing all evidence on
which reliance is placed and stating the legal theories relied upon with
reference to supporting authorities. Copies of documentary evidence
must be submitted with the pleadings, as well as the written statements of
all witnesses to be proffered. Normally, each party submits two plead-
ings: the plaintiff a complaint and a reply; the defendant an answer and a
rebuttal. At the subsequent oral hearing, the parties may not rely on any
evidence or legal theory not submitted with the pleadings, unless the tri-
bunal, for good cause shown, directs otherwise. This encourages the par-
ties not to withhold information before the hearing.
After completion of the pleading stage, either party may apply to
the tribunal for further discovery. The tribunal then determines whether
any further discovery is needed. If it finds this to be the case, the tribunal
specifies what information is to be sought and how it is to be obtained.'
The advantages of this procedure are obvious. Most of the relevant
information is discovered automatically through the pleadings. At the
conclusion of the pleading stage, the tribunal is in an excellent position to
judge whether and what additional discovery is needed and how it can
best be obtained. Its position in this regard differs markedly from that of
an American judge who, in the pre-discovery conference, must seek to
regulate discovery in a case of which he knows very little.41
This procedure also achieves considerable savings of time and effort
39 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Proposed by the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, August 1991, Proposed
Rules 26 and 37(c).
40 The parties do not have a choice as to which discovery devices are to be used; the tribunal
makes that determination.
41 This is the main drawback of the judicial supervision of the discovery process in the United
States.
Vol. 17:281 1991290
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at the hearing. Direct testimony can be limited to asking the witness to
affirm the correctness of his written statement and little time is spent on
introducing documentary evidence. Of course, this procedure cannot be
followed without modification to cases tried before a jury, but even in
these cases the discovery phase needs no alterations.
The procedure here discussed may be used in cases arising under the
Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, in arbitrations involving
American and Canadian parties, and, eventually, in cases adjudicated in
the ordinary courts.42
VI. RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS
American rules relating to the recognition of foreign judgments are
quite liberal. As a general rule, foreign judgments are recognized, unless
the foreign court lacked a proper basis for its adjudicatory authority or
failed to accord the defendant due process, including proper notification
and reasonable procedures.43 To the extent Canadian rules follow the
common law and English rules, they provide a similar regime.
As already indicated, it would appear desirable to eliminate tran-
sient presence of both persons and things as a proper basis of adjudica-
tory authority in the relations between Americans and Canadians.' It
would also be desirable to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments
through simple registration rather than bringing an action on the foreign
judgment.45
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The European context offers a fruitful perspective from which to
consider improving litigation rules relating to disputes between Ameri-
cans and Canadians. The European Judgments Convention sets a proper
example by eliminating adjudicatory authority based on mere presence.
In any event, in the relations between the United States and Canada,
appropriate recourse should be taken to the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens to ensure adjudication in the more appropriate forum.
The Hague Service Convention, as construed by the United States
Supreme Court, does not offer a proper regime for regulating service, but
European rules that declare service sufficient once it actually reaches the
addressee provide a most worthwhile source of inspiration.
Fortunately, Canada does not appear to have ratified the Evidence
42 The procedure here described could be tested, by way of experiment, in actions involving
American and Canadian litigants.
43 See generally Hans Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United
States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 44 (1962).
44 See text, supra note 6.
45 The registration procedure of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 may provide an example. See also the
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 13 U.S.A. 149 (1986), providing for an accelerated
type of summary judgment, preceded by registration, in regard to sister state judgments.
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Convention, so that this Convention will not impede Canada and the
United States from obtaining evidence in one country for use in the
other. However, Canada would do well to ratify The Hague Official
Documents Convention and to repeal the blocking statutes it has, for
these statutes do not achieve the desired result and add undesirable
frictions.
The actual process of adjudication in the United States is in dire
need of reform. European approaches and those developed in interna-
tional arbitration provide admirable guidance to those intent upon imple-
menting such reform.
The rules relating to recognition of foreign judgments prevailing in
the United States and Canada are quite adequate. A bilateral conven-
tion, in addition to eliminating mere presence as a basis for adjudicatory
authority, could further facilitate mutual recognition of judgments by
providing for enforcement through simple registration.
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